Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1991

Legal Process and Judges in the Real World
Peter L. Strauss
Columbia Law School, strauss@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Judges Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Peter L. Strauss, Legal Process and Judges in the Real World, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1653 (1991).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3730

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

COMMENT: LEGAL PROCESS AND JUDGES
IN THE REAL WORLD
Peter L. Strauss*

It is gratifying, reading through a paper and noting here and
there points that you might like to make, to find that by the end the
· author has anticipated them and made them well. This paper sneaks
up on you. If at the outset it seems to be accepting that Justice Scalia
has a jurisprudence of statutory interpretation that coheres and restrains, by the end it has shown the self-contradictions and decidedly
political and institutional stakes in the textualist position the Justice
appears to have been carving out for himself. 1
I am not going to address Professor Zeppos's account of Justice
Scalia's approach to statutory construction and its problems as such.
The Justice's general preference for textualism is a striking characteristic of his opinion-writing, and I find Professor Zeppos's analysis of
the faults of textualism convincing. At the end, when he moves out
from the Justice's relationship to statutes to the larger field of President, Congress, and agency, he points approvingly to a number of
suggestions I've made; they are elaborated in two works now in draft
that do not need to be repeated here. 2
Three cautionary propositions about the nature of an enterprise
like Professor Zeppos's do seem worth stating:
Judges act in and against the real world, not the world of
academic theory.
Public choice theory and other academic theories are
grounded in premises about human behavior that do not depend on the job held by the individual they describe; that is,
a public choice theorist would have ways of talking about
judging and being an executive as well as legislating.
If we are constructing· a theory about government and
• Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University. These remarks were made in response to
the version of Professor Zeppos's paper delivered to the conference, and-under the pressure
of other undertakings and with his encouragement-have not been much altered to reflect the
changes he made to his paper following those proceedings.
1 See also, to the same effect, Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes:
Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295 (1990).
2 Strauss, Relational Readers of Intransitive Statutes: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History (forthcoming in CHl.[-]KENT L. REV.); Strauss, Review Essay: Sunstein, Statutes and the Common Law-Reconciling Markets, the Communal Impulse and the
Mammoth State, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 801 (1991).
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judges' place in it, then that theory has to pay as much attention to the judges and what will support and/or constrain
their work as it pays to the rest of the government of which
they are a part.
I want to stress at the outset that this is largely a rhetorical critique.
Professor Zeppos's earlier writings and this one all contain passages
that seem to reflect acceptance of these propositions. Yet he has chosen to make the literature central rather than the facts-a choice
some see as rather characteristic of much of today's legal scholarship, 3 and a choice that seems to me to risk wrestling with shadows. I
do not think my three propositions change the bottom line, but they
might alter the manner in which Professor Zeppos presents his analysis, and in doing so bring him closer to the judicial problem he means
to address.
First, then: Judges act in and against the real world, not the world
of academic theory. In my judgment, it is inappropriate to make
Professors Hart and Sacks the stalking horse for analysis, even of a
fallen academic like Justice Scalia.
Justice Scalia is, after all, also a former executive officialhe held three executive branch posts that gave him unusual
opportunities for insight into the operation of executive and
congressional government; 4
He is a practitioner of high-level politics-for several years,
he edited Regulation Magazine, the principal commentary
on governmental matters of the American Enterprise
Institute;

He has been very active in the bar on matters of administrative law practice and reform; 5
And he heard and decided administrative and statutory
cases as a member of the D.C. Circuit, the court of appeals
most responsible for governmental law matters, for' a
number of years before his elevation to the Supreme Court.
Even if Justice Scalia was aware of the influence of The Legal Process
3

Carrington, Aftermath (draft 1990) (to be published by Oxford Univ. Press in a Fest-

schrift for Patrick Atiyah).
4 Justice Scalia was General Counsel in the White House Office of Telecommunications
Policy, 1971-72, Administrator of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 197274, and Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel-the President's lawyer in
the Department of Justice-1974-77.
·
5 Chair, Section of Administrative Law, 1981-82; consultant, ABA Coordinating Group
on Regulatory Reform, 1979-81.
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in some circles, especially academic circles, these direct experiences of
government are more likely to form the ground for his behavior and
provide the targets for his own analyses than are someone else's theoretical constructs for reconciling law and politics in government.
Indeed, we can readily point to four important institutional
changes that set the context for Justice Scalia's positions:
First is the growing congressional self-consciousness about the
uses to which legislative history are put. When courts began to refer
to legislative history, that use was unexpected, and the quality of intracongressional dialogue was relatively high; members of Congress
regularly debated one another, dealt face to face, expected to resolve
issues directly. From the resulting documentary traces, an impartial
observer might expect to learn a good deal about the political impulses that had given rise to legislation. Now, judicial use is routine
and expected, and can be consciously planned for; this expectation of
the observer has obvious implications not only for Congress's behavior but also for the caution with which the observer must then
proceed. 6
Second, and related, is the tremendous growth of congressional
bureaucracy, a growth that has sharply altered the internal dialogues
of Congress. Members of Congress now deal through their staffs,
spend relatively little time themselves on legislative issues, enact "intransitive" legislation whose tendency is to create problem solvers
rather than to resolve problems. This could compound the legislative
history problem, if congressional staff, acting with or without the help
of the tremendous number of interested lobbyists now to be found in
Washington, create legislative history precisely in the hope it will influence the courts, with little or no direct supervision by their principals and with little or no attention to its impact on the congressional
debates. In my own judgment, that story is oversimple, but it is being
told with some frequency these days. 7
In one respect the story is oversimple because legislative behavior
is response as well as potential stimulus. To say that "legislative history is an effort to make law . . . by an end run around article 1" 8
6 Thus, the Justice's often-quoted concurrences in Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d l, 6-8
(D.C.Cir. 1985) and Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989). See, e.g., Wald, The
Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States
Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 277, 281 (1990); Costello, Average Voting Members and
Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and
Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39 passim.
7 See supra note 6.
s Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1597, 1617 n.124 (1991).
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captures only the second part; it hides from view the extent to which
the very fact of legislative history, as well as any specific content, captures current political disputes that set the context within which legislative action occurs and within which all the political actors, from
members of Congress to the President, as well as private citizens subject to the measure understand what is going on. As Professor Zeppos
remarked in an earlier work, 9 a judge who abjures that context years
later is asserting strong law-making prerogatives for herself.
What also makes the story oversimple is a third change in our
institutional context, one I have elsewhere suggested may point in the
opposite direction but in any event needs to be taken into account. 10
This is the fact of congressional reliance on administrative agencies
for so much of the work of giving meaning to law. Agencies have a
different relationship to Congress, staff, and legislative history than do
the nonpolitical, only occasionally engaged courts; they are constant
players, concededly creatures of politics as well as law. The attention
paid to their initiative in resolving issues of statutory meaning 11 suggests that one ought to-although Justice Scalia does not-think
about the problem of using legislative history from their perspective.
Legitimating agency reference to leg_islative history would tend to
tie agencies somewhat more closely to legislative politics, and that
suggests the fourth institutional change--one Professor Zeppos recognizes, and one that both puts a political coloration on the Scalia position and suggests significant separation-of-power consequences for it.
In recent decades we have fallen into the habit of electing Republican
Presidents and Democrat Congresses. Judges appointed by Republican Presidents then may have some political reasons for hostility to
Congress relative to the President; it is unsurprising, from this perspective, that the move to textualism is being orchestrated by recent
Republican appointees. 12 Combining the enhancement of Presidential
authority suggested by decisions like Chevron 13 with the alteration in
congressional politics likely to result from a devaluation of legislative
history works a significant shift in power to the President. The more
troublesome element in this is that it also works a shift, in my judgSee supra note 1.
See supra note 2.
11 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511.
12 Cf Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation:
How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160; for a well-developed argument that Justice
Scalia's position is better placed in personal history than political preference, see Kannar, The
Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990).
13 Chevron, 467 U.S. 837.
9

10
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ment, away from law. If the agencies may devalue legislative history,
they are that much freer to treat a statute just as they want to in the
current day; the President is that much freer to tell them how to treat
it; Congress is reduced to using contemporary oversight controlsreal politics but not legislative politics; and the courts are that much
farther from a capacity to enforce the standards of reasoned judgment
that, in the administrative state, are a major element of the world of
law.
These changes, then-growing congressional self-consciousness
about the uses of legislative history; the bureaucraticization of Congress; reliance on intransitive statutes and, relatedly, agency judgment; and our recent habit of splitting power between a Republican
White House and a Democrat Capitol-these seem to me to provide
more the context for understanding Justice Scalia's statutory jurisprudence than any possible reaction to the work of Hart and Sacks.
A second and perhaps the more important problem with treating
Justice Scalia's work in terms of textualism is that he is not a theorist
but a judge. In prefatory remarks to a recent series of talks on constitutional interpretation of which Justice Scalia was a part, Dean Gerety of the University of Cincinnati's Law School remarked that "what
strikes me most in these essays ... is the sense of resistance they show
to what I will call the simplifying force of theory." 14 And Justice
Scalia's work, as I think Professor Zeppos would agree, is generally
exacting and sophisticated in its attention to the small grain-whether
or not we would agree with all its outcomes. 15 If Justice Scalia prefers
constitutional originalism but abjures legislative history, as it appears
he does, perhaps that is because constitutional history, on the whole,
is ancient enough not to have been dominated by the drafters' awareness of its possible influence on later interpretive communities, as he
believes to have occurred for contemporary statutes. 16 "Originalism,"
he writes, "does not aggravate the principal weakness of the system,
14 Gerety, The Justice, The Senator and the Judge: Essays in Constitutional Interpretation,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 847 (1989).
1s See, for example, his lengthy concurrence to Crandon v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 997
(1990), the case Professor Zeppos discusses at length in his analysis, see Zeppos, supra note 8,
at 1606-14, and Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1988), in which the Justice
wrote for a bare majority of the Court, the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and
White dissenting. In the latter case, despite his usual preference for deferring to agency interpretation, Justice Scalia upheld potential government liability under the Black Lung Benefits
Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 239, 92 Stat. 95 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and
30 U.S.C), that had been denied by a regulation he found statutorily unsupported.
16 Of course, the drafters deliberately kept the journals of their meetings confidential, even
as they provided that the new Congress would keep journals that were largely public, U.S.
CONST. art. I,§ 5, cl. 3-arguably a recognition of the problem, but therefore also some assurance that those journals were not manipulated for external effect.
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for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself." 17 When he can see
the use of legislative history in the same terms-not as an exercise in
deriving particular meaning fraught with the hazards of lobbyist
traps, but as setting a historical criterion of general purpose and understanding that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of
the judge himself-he seems open to its use. 18
My second and third propositions are about the world of theory,
and I shall have rather less to say about them.
The second proposition, then: Public choice theory and other academic theories are grounded in premises about human behavior that do
not depend on the job held by the individual they describe; that is, a
public choice theorist would have ways of talking about judging and
being an executive as well as legislating. One easily falls into a kind of
intellectual trap in theorizing about human behavior, which is to assume that the theorist, observer, or perhaps some other human actor
than the one under scrutiny is not subject to the same premises. If I
premise analysis on a general proposition about human behavior, for
example that people are rational self-interest maximizers, then that is
a proposition I must be willing to apply to the whole group-to academics as well as to judges as well as to executives as well as to legislators. If such premises suggest that the imperfections in electoral
control over legislators combine with the practical incentives they
have to secure reelection to produce legislation inevitably reflective of
private deals rather than the pursuit of some public interest, then I
want also to know what those premises suggest about the behavior of
a panel of three judges appointed to life tenure in a political process,
and who may reasonably believe that not one in two hundred of their
decisions will be reviewed by higher authority, when that panel decides a contestable proposition of law. 19 It is quite impermissible to
treat judges-or academics for that matter-as upstanding types who
may act in the public interest (Including when they opt for ostensibly
self-denying approaches) unless we are willing so to treat legislators
and the President. These last are people we can throw out when they
act in a rascally way (at least in theory we can throw them out) and
history teaches me that the risk of judges acting to block the public's
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989).
See, e.g., Green v. Boch Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (concurrence
grounded in Congress's probable general understanding at the time the Rule of Evidence at
issue was adopted).
19 Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093
(1987).
11
18
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wishes is endemic-sometimes desirable, as in the case of civil liberties, but always endemic.
For me, I should add, the premises about human conduct associated with the Chicago school-and their current influence leads me to
hope I do not understand them-deny human altruism (along with
our emotionality); that altruism is a good part of the experienced reality of human behavior, and denying it encourages its atrophying. Collective action becomes all the more difficult if one has been persuaded
in a theoretical way that unselfish action will never occur, that all
must be reasoned· from the base of individual self-interest. But if we
are to act in the public sphere on the basis of what these premises
teach us, we cannot afford to be partial about it. We must look
unblinkingly at what they say about judges and about the academics
who produce analyses like this one, as well as at their implications for
legislating and executing the law. ,Again, the implications for judging
appear to me to be no prettier than the implications for legislating.
The impoverishment of Justice Scalia's view of proper judicial role, to
which I shall return to in a moment, suggests that he might accept
this point; but then what we see is that these premises lead to a public
realm that on the whole, not just in legislative respects, lacks principled restraint.
Finally, my third proposition: If we are constructing a theory
about government and judges' place in it, then that theory has to pay as
much attention to the judges and what will support and/or constrain
their work as it pays to the rest of the government of which they are a
part. Here, in my view, is where the rehabilitation, or at least the
recasting, of Hart and Sacks might begin. Once one understands, as
Professor Zeppos agrees, 20 that Professors Hart and Sacks, too, were
reacting to phenomena in the real world-an actual Congress as well
as actual courts and other actors-it becomes quite impossible to
ascribe any descriptive purpose to their oft-quoted remark that legislators are to be taken as reasonable persons acting reasonably in the
pursuit of rational purposes. 21 Congress's process has changed, but it
hasn't changed that much; it was in the late nineteenth century that
Bismarck is said to have remarked that persons favoring legislation
and sausage should never watch either :being made.72
Hart and Sacks were not naive enough to think they were
Zeppos, supra note 8, at 1598.
This seems to me an error made in the commentaries Professor Zeppos refers to in his
extended discussion of the "purposivism" of Hart and Sachs. Zeppos, supra note 8, at 1600
nn.18-22.
22 See Community Nutrition Institute v. Block, 749 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.).
20
21
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describing an actual legislature; they were prescribing an attitude toward legislation that would be appropriate for a judge, despite the
contrary reality such sophisticated observers knew even a half-hearted
observer would quickly discover. The normative basis for that prescription lay in ideas about the appropriate role of judges and of law
in relation to political government and, particularly, the Congress.
One might say that in telling judges what attitudes they ought to take
to legislative work product-that that product must, normatively
must, be regarded as the result of reasonable persons reasonably seeking rational purposes-those instructions comprised their theory of
separation of powers; it told judges what was their place in the universe of government, where statutory law stood in relation to common law, where legislative initiative stood in relation to judicial
initiative, in framing the legal order within which we live.
The consequences for Professor Zeppos: Professor Zeppos is
surely right in asserting that Professors Hart and Sacks, on the one
hand, and Justice Scalia, on the other, have a good deal in common,
although I might put the proposition a bit differently than he does.
For both, the realm of law is idealized as a coherent, integrated unity;
for both, the judge is the ultimate voicer of that unity; for both, the
judicial voice must be the voice of reason, of judgment and not will in
Hamilton's terms. 23 The result, for both, is to produce a powerful
tension, one that can perhaps be mediated but that can never be resolved. On the one hand is a robust view of judging-with, as Chief
Justice Stone once put it, judges creating "a unified system of judgemade and statute law woven into a seamless whole by the processes of
adjudication. " 24 And on the other is the proposition that judges are
not entitled to seek the fulfillment of personal political goals, that they
must restrain themselves to the artificial reason of the law, within the
premises that the larger political system creates.
Hart and Sacks, as I understand them, respond to the resulting
tension by insisting that judges treat statutes as the product of 'reason-not because they are the products of reason, but because doing
so will serve the twin ends of reminding judges of their inferior place
in the world of policy formation and permitting judges to act on them
in the characteristic judicial way, restrained by the requirement of
reasoning toward coherence. If judges cannot treat statutes as the
product of reason, they cannot coherently reason with them; to admit
23 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), quoted in, Public
Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2575 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
24 Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (1936).
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the irrationality of statutes both threatens to reawaken judicial claims
of superiority to legislatures-such disdain for legislative effort by
smugly rational courts was the basis of the ancient canon that statutes
in derogation of the common law were to be narrowly construedand makes the court's treatment of the statute an act of will rather
than judgment, whatever the court chooses.
From this perspective, the examination of legislative history is
supplementary in just the sense that Justice Scalia admits when it
comes to the context of constitutional provisions: it reaffirms the
judge's political subordination by requiring her to read the statute in
the context of the political history experienced by others than herself
in producing it. It doesn't pretend precise meanings will be found; yet
it asserts judicial judgment will be informed by information the political actors had. It treats the judge, as it treats the legislator, as a
person capable of acting in a public interest way although having to
be watched, in some sense, in doing so.
Justice Scalia also seeks coherence in his way, as Professor Zeppos illustrates by showing us his attention to the United States Code
as a whole, 25 and he also means to keep the courts out of politics. Yet
his route is to an impoverished, and yet threatening, view of the judiciary. In important ways, Justice Scalia's judge appears to be the
judge, not of the common law, but of the civilians-a judge freed of
responsibility for developing coherence although she is to assume it, a
judge notably subordinate as well as formalistic in her address to legal
issues. 26 To take an example Professor Zeppos does not develop but
that certainly supports this picture, consider the problem of implying
private remedies from public statutes. Justice Scalia has been emphatic that federal judges ought not find such remedies there unless
explicit direction to create them can be found, and he grounds that
position in virtual denial of the common-law, integrationist, coherence-building function of the federal judge. 27
See Zeppos, supra note 8, at 1620-23 (n.147).
Justice Scalia states his difficulties with the common-law tradition in Scalia, The Rule of
Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); cf. Kannar, supra note 12. In fairness
to the Justice, it is appropriate to note that he ties his difficulties quite explicitly to the current
nature of Supreme Court jurisdiction, in which (a) the Court has virtually complete control
over its docket; and (b) lower courts hardly ever encounter discipline of Supreme Court review. Cf. Strauss, supra note 19. It is useful to recall that our comfort with the virtues of caseby-case, factually oriented, and rule-limited adjudication developed in the context of appellate
jurisdiction that was mandatory, and judicial encounters with issues that were frequent.
27 See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Compare United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (Justice Scalia declined to employ commonlaw reasoning to find tort liability, in the face of commanding facts suggesting that the armed
services had deliberately made a serviceman the unwitting subject of an experiment with LSD)
with Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1987) (Justice Scalia found a federal
2s

26

1662

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1653

Writing in 1908, Roscoe Pound conceived four ways in which
"courts in such a legal system as ours might deal with a legislative
innovation"; 28 putting them in the order that would suggest the line of
progress for which he hoped, they were:
First, to treat it as limited to the circumstances to which it
expressly applied, refusing to reason from it by analogy;
Second, to interpret it sympathetically to apparent purpose,
but not as a source for analogical reasoning;
Third, to accept it as embodying a policy from which judges
might reason as at common law, but having no greater dignity than the policies reflected in the judge-made rules of the
common law;
Fourth, to accept the statute as embodying a policy from
which judges are to reason analogically as at common law,
and which "as a later and more direct expression of the general will [is] of superior authority to judge-made rules on the
same general subject." 29
Hart and Sachs point at this last approach, the highest development
in Pound's pantheon. Distrusting Congress and fearing judges, Justice Scalia not only opts for the first and narrowest of these formulations vis a vis statutes, but also denies the strong common law that
was its alternative "in such a legal system as ours." 30 The result, as
Professor Zeppos shows us, emphasizes the authority of the President
and undercuts the claims of law. And therein lies the threat. 31
common-law immunity for military contractors against state tort actions). Both cases are discussed in Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1351-54, 1367-68. See also supra note 26.
28 Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385 (1908).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 For a strong signal of judicial retreat, closing off the judiciary even as a point of access
and stressing the limitations of the judicial role, see Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, five
to four, in Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3190 (1990); to similar effect, in
the politically less important context of "pendant party jurisdiction," see Finley v. United
States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).

